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Conclusions that are drawn from experiments are subject to varying
degrees of uncertainty. For example, they might rely on small data
sets, employ statistical techniques that make assumptions that are
hard to verify, or theremay be unknown confounding factors. In this
paper we propose an alternative but complementary mechanism
to explicitly incorporate these various sources of uncertainty into
reasoning about empirical findings, by applying Subjective Logic.
To do this we show how typical traditional results can be encoded as
“subjective opinions” – the building blocks of Subjective Logic. We
demonstrate the value of the approach by using Subjective Logic
to aggregate empirical results from two large published studies
that explore the relationship between programming languages and
defects or failures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The task of analysing and communicating empirical data inevitably
requires the ability to reason about uncertainty. There may be
experimental factors that are beyond our control. Results might be
dispersed and not point to a specific outcome. Data may be subject
to measurement errors or sampling biases.
This uncertainty is generally impossible to eradicate. Good prac-
tice dictates that findings should be accompanied by appropriate
caveats and metrics to support a fully informed interpretation.
These might include extensive threats to validity, power statistics,
significance statistics, confidence intervals, probabilistic models
and openly-available data and materials to enable replications.
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Within the Software Engineering community there have been
several recent laudable initiatives that have sought to improve the
trustworthiness of empirical results. This has been spurred by nu-
merous negative findings, both from broader scientific community
[17] as well as the Software Engineering community itself [12, 19],
that highlight major problems with the reliance on traditional ‘fre-
quentist’ statistics. For example Jørgensen et al. [19] suggest that
up to 40% of results that are deemed to be “statistically significant”
could be incorrect. To address this apparent crisis, Software Engi-
neering conferences are increasingly supporting replicability by
encouraging artefact submissions, the Open Data initiative is be-
ing increasingly promoted, as is the use of Bayesian techniques to
explicitly reason about uncertainty in empirical results [12, 14].
Despite this increasing armoury of statistical tools, current ap-
proaches can be difficult to apply, particularly whenmultiple studies
are involved. An overall “uncertainty”, whether conveyed as a prob-
ability distribution, p-value, or confidence-interval, is inherently
tied to a specific experimental setting. When there are multiple
experiments, each will invariably have its own sources of uncer-
tainty, which can be difficult to reconcile when the results of the
experiment are combined. This becomes especially problematic
when (for example):
• The data from the studies are measured using different tech-
niques and are associated with different measurement errors.
• The studies use different empirical paradigms (e.g., surveys
and quasi-experiments).
• The studies sample non-randomly from disjoint or partially-
overlapping populations.
The broader challenge of “fusing” together sources of uncertain
data is well-established. In the context of statistics, work on using
uncertainty as an explicit component to reason about epistemic
beliefs dates back to the work of Dempster and Shafer [33]. This
line of work has, over the years, given rise to Subjective Logic [21]
- a framework for reasoning about complex phenomena that are
subject to uncertainty. Such frameworks have been successfully ap-
plied to reason about a wide variety of decision problems, spanning
fields such as Sensor Fusion [23], Law [22], Argumentation Theory
[3], safety critical systems [8, 25], and vehicular communications
systems [7].
In this paper we show how Subjective Logic can provide a useful
framework within empirical software engineering to handle the
problems of uncertainty that arise in empirical studies. Most im-
portantly, it offers a degree of flexibility, enabling the researcher
to combine findings from studies that might be diverse in nature,
whilst explicitly factoring-in their respective underlying uncertain-
ties. We do not suggest that Subjective Logic should replace other
reasoning mechanisms such as meta-analysis but we do believe it
is complementary.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
provide an overview of existing approaches, and introduce a small
motivating example, where we present the results from a multi-
site study comparing test-driven development to iterative test-last
development [34]. In Section 3 we provide an introduction to Subjec-
tive Logic. In Section 4 we show how Subjective Logic can be used
to examine experimental outcomes, illustrating some of the key
steps with respect to the motivating example presented in Section
2. In Section 5 we use Subjective Logic to combine data from two
(loosely) related published studies on the fault / failure proneness
of programming languages [26, 30]. Finally, in Section 6 we close
with conclusions and avenues for future work.
2 BACKGROUND
We start with an overview of existing approaches to aggregate em-
pirical results. This is followed by an introduction to our motivating
example, which will also be used to illustrate our application of
Subjective Logic to software engineering.
2.1 The Challenge of Aggregating Empirical
Results
Software Engineering experiments commonly comprise the collec-
tion of response data (in a controlled setting) to evaluate different
treatments [36]. The analysis typically involves the application
of traditional statistical techniques, such as testing for statistical
significance or establishing effect-sizes with associated confidence
intervals [9, 12]. Using practitioners is challenging, because devel-
oper time is at a premium [10]. Moreover projects and settings
can vary significantly in terms of scale and complexity from one
domain to the other. As a consequence, findings are subject to a
considerable degree of intrinsic uncertainty and need to be treated
with some circumspection.
There are numerous approaches that can be used to analyse
or aggregate empirical results. The choice of approach critically
depends on the nature of the studies under analysis. In their review
of candidate approaches [31], Santos and Juristo refer to three
commonly used approaches: Narrative Synthesis, Aggregated Data,
and Individual Participant Data (they also discuss the aggregation
of p-values, which is problematic and not widely used in Software
Engineering, so we do not cover it here). We do however include a
further approach that is particularly relevant to Subjective Logic -
Bayesian Analysis. We briefly review these four approaches here.
Narrative Synthesis [28] is used to provide a textual summary
of empirical results, with the aim of forming an overall conclusion.
It is widely used because it is straightforward to apply, but it does
not provide quantitative results (e.g., joint effect-sizes or p-values)
and can also lead to ambiguities [31]. In addition, results are not
easy to reproduce.
Aggregated Data (AD) or ‘meta-analysis of effect-sizes’ is in-
creasingly used in Software Engineering [31] (we will be providing
an example in Figure 1). AD is popular because it can accommodate
experiments with different designs and response variable scales,
and can handle heterogeneity [31]. Moderating factors (e.g., pro-
grammer experience in developer studies) can be handled by per-
forming a meta-regression with each moderating factor [32] (i.e.,
to fit a line between scores given for programmer experience and
the effect-size). This approach to handling moderating factors can
be problematic, in the sense that the core results of the AD (effect
sizes and confidence intervals) are presented separately from the
meta-regression results. If there are many moderating factors, this
can make the outcomes of the experiment as a whole difficult to
interpret.
Individual Participant Data mega-trial (IPD) refers to the
process of pooling the raw data from multiple experiments, and
re-analysing it as if the pooled data were obtained from a single,
large experiment. Santos and Juristo note that this can produce
biased results if there are differences in the design of the studies —
even subtle ones — or different numbers of experimental units. One
further obvious obstacle is that it depends upon the availability of
the raw data, which is not the case for any of the other techniques
reviewed here. If the raw data is available, however, it can be very
helpful for deriving uncertainty values.
Bayesian analysis refers to a family of techniques that take
advantage of Bayes’ Theorem, the statement that the posterior
probability is proportional to the likelihood times the prior. If any
two of these are known, it is possible to derive the third. This pro-
vides a powerful framework, within which it is possible to examine
the relationship between potential causes and effects, whilst in-
corporating assumptions about prior probabilities. Furia et al. [12]
have shown how Bayesian analysis can improve upon traditional
“frequentist” counterparts (we shall be re-visiting the same data
they used for our own case study in this paper).
One weakness of Bayesian analyses is the requirement for prior
probabilities, which can be difficult to obtain [13]. In the absence
of a prior, Bayesian approaches are forced to resort to using “un-
informative” priors such as the uniform prior. In other words, the
probabilities of two propositions A and Amight be deemed to be
equal (0.5 each). The problem is that term ‘uninformative’ is in fact a
misnomer; to indicate that two propositions are equally likely is not
equivalent to the statement that their respective probabilities are
in fact unknown. This apportioning of arbitrary prior probabilities
can end up leading to skewed results [24].
2.2 Running Example
As a running example we refer to a multi-site experiment carried
out by Tosun et al. [34] (Santos and Juristo subsequently used this
to motivate their review of meta-analysis / experiment aggrega-
tion techniques [32]). The experiment investigated the effect of
test-driven development (TDD) on software quality. For this, par-
ticipants were split into two groups, where one group applied TDD
and the other followed the Iterative-Test Last (ITL) process. The
response variable is the “functional correctness” of the resulting
software, measured as the percentage of passing test cases. Some
key data-points and summary statistics1 are shown in Table 1. They
consist of three small-scale experiments at an industrial partner
1The summary statistics we have computed here are slightly larger than those pub-
lished by Santos et al. [32] who use a different random effects model to ours, because
we were unable to trace the correlation-between-groups data that would have been
required to parameterise the Q-statistic estimator that they incorporated. Note, also
the power calculations are based upon the post hoc effect sizes which are very likely
upwardly biased [18].
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Table 1: Key statistics for the multi-site testing experiments of Tosun et al. [34]
Experiment Experience Scores Results (per group) Summary ResultsProgramming Java Unit JUnit Treatment N Mean SD Hedge’s g CI(95%) Power
F-Secure H 3.67 2.33 2.17 2.17 ITL 6 30.71 36.58 0.25 [-0.89,1.39] 0.071TDD 6 40.23 33.43
F-Secure K 2.91 1.82 1.64 1.27 ITL 11 22.17 20.44 0.44 [-0.40,1.29] 0.179TDD 11 35.42 35.40
F-Secure O 3.29 2.71 2.71 2 ITL 7 16.05 20.81 1.85 [0.6,3.11] 0.93TDD 7 68.97 31.53
UPV 2.36 1.88 1.04 1 ITL 31 33.38 39.79 1.34 [0.78,1.91] 0.999TDD 29 77.16 21.04
RE Model






1.34 [ 0.78, 1.91]
1.85 [ 0.60, 3.11]
0.44 [−0.40, 1.29]
0.25 [−0.89, 1.39]
1.11 [ 0.39, 1.82]
Figure 1: Forest plot of random-effects model for the multi-
site testing experiments of Tosun et al. [34]
(F-Secure), prefixed with ‘FS’ in the table, and one larger student-
based study at Universidad Politecnica de Madrid (denoted ‘UPV’
in the table).
The task of determining “the outcome” for any of the individual
experiments is challenging. The usual approach is to undertake a
meta-analysis [2, 15]. Figure 1 shows the forest plot of a random
effects model. Some of the studies (F-Secure H and K) have small
numbers of participants, and produce results with large standard
deviations, which explains their low power (this is conveyed by
the size of the centre point for each experiment. Note that that the
pooled result is shown by the diamond and denoted “RE [random
effects] model". Aside from this statistical uncertainty conveyed
by the confidence intervals in the forest plot, there is also the un-
certainty from potential moderators such that the appropriateness
of the experimental design and analyses, and the experience of
participants. When trying to aggregate the various results (e.g., via
meta-analysis), the analyst also has to accommodate the hetero-
geneity of the experiments. As highlighted by Santos and Juristo
[32], the results do not appear to be consistent, so the analyst has
to determine whether this is because of differences in the experi-
mental setting — for instance, the numbers of participants and their
difference in experience — and has to adjust for this potential bias.
Ultimately, empirical results are difficult to interpret because
they are beset by different degrees and types of uncertainty that
can be difficult to capture. Currently, the task of interpreting and
fusing-together uncertainties from different statistics is largely left
to the intuition of the analyst. In this paper we try to make this
process more transparent and explicit with the help of Subjective
Logic.
3 BELIEF MODELLING, UNCERTAINTY, AND
SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
Over the past 50 years (spurred by the emergence of AI in the
60s and 70s) numerous probabilistic frameworks have been devel-
oped to reason about uncertain phenomena. These (in simplistic
terms) seek to ‘... combine the capacity of probability theory to handle
likelihood with the capacity of binary logic to make inference from
argument structures.’ [21]. These enable a modeller to link propo-
sitions (“beliefs”) with probabilities. Popular approaches include
Fuzzy Logic [37], Dempster Shafer theory [33], and Bayesian anal-
ysis techniques such as Bayesian Networks [27]. To motivate our
choice of probabilistic logic, it is first necessary to provide a more
detailed definition of ‘uncertainty’.
Definition 3.1. By ‘uncertainty’, we refer to the situation where a
lack of information or knowledge influences our ability to produce a
definitive description or quantification of some proposition or belief.
This lack of information can come in various forms [6], such as the
inability to derive a firm result because of the intrinsic randomness
or variability of some variable (aleatoric uncertainty), or because
of the absolute absence or lack of information or data (epistemic
uncertainty).
These sources of uncertainty (both types feature in our running
example) are difficult to characterise and measure. It is impossible,
for example, to be certain that we have considered all of the possible
confounding factors in the TDD experiment, especially since we
were not involved in designing or running the actual experiments).
This leads us to second-order uncertainty [13] - our trust (or lack
thereof) in our assessment of the various uncertainties.
Dempster Shafer theory [33] is particularly useful because it
provides us with a basis for accommodating these different lev-
els of uncertainty. In Dempster Shafer theory (as is the case in
most conventional probabilistic logics), a proposition about some
phenomenon (a “belief”) is characterised as a probability (e.g., the
belief that application of some testing methodology improves soft-
ware correctness). However, instead of forcing us to pick a ‘hard’
probability (which is not possible if we consider the evidence from
the above study), we can associate this with an explicit measure
of uncertainty (e.g., we might consider the heterogeneity between
studies, weighing up the expertise versus power, etc.).

























(a) Basic dimensions. (b) Mapping from experiments.
Figure 2: Barycentric triangles.
In his work on Subjective Logic [21], which is derived from
Dempster Shafer theory, Jøsang provides a helpful formalismwithin
which to model and reason about beliefs. The building-blocks to
model basic beliefs are referred to as subjective opinions. In this paper
we focus on binomial opinions, where the opinion revolves around
the truth or falsehood of some x (as opposed to a multinomial
opinion where a belief can have multiple dimensions – though
these can also be readily represented in Subjective Logic [21]).
Definition 3.2. For a (binomial) subjective opinion, letX = {x, x}
be a binary domain with binomial random variable X ∈ X. A sub-
jective opinion about the truth of x is represented as a quadruplet:
ωx = (bx ,dx ,ux ,ax ):
• bx : Belief mass in support of x being true.
• dx : Disbelief mass in support of x being false.
• ux : Uncertainty mass representing the ‘vacuity of evidence’.
• ax : Prior probability of x without any evidence. For the sake
of simplicity, we will assume the convention that without
any prior evidence, the prior probability ax = 0.5.
For an opinion to be valid, bx + dx + ux = 1.
There are several special types of opinions:
• bx = 1 or dx = 1: absolute opinion - equivalent to Boolean
true or false,
• ux = 0: dogmatic opinion – a traditional probability,
• ux = 1: a vacuous opinion with no belief or disbelief.
A subjective opinion can be visualised as an equilateral barycen-
tric triangle [20], where each of the vertices represents the maxi-
mum for belief, disbelief and uncertainty respectively. This coordi-
nate system is illustrated in Figure 2(a).
Definition 3.3. Given an opinionωx , the projected probability P(x)
[21] can be defined as P(x) = bx + axux .
Definition 3.4. The beta-distribution refers to a family of distri-
butions that are a continuous version of the binomial distribution,
which make them appropriate for modelling probabilities [8]. Its
probability density function is defined by two ‘shape’ parameters
α and β , and is described by:
f (x ;α, β) =
1
B(α, β)
xα−1(1 − x)β−1, 0 < x < 1
where α > 0, β > 0 and B(α, β) is the beta function.
Jøsang has shown how subjective opinions can be mapped to
the α and β parameters [21], making it possible to interpret a
single subjective opinion ‘coordinate’ as continuous distribution,
where the ‘density’ represents the probability. A distribution with
a well-defined peak indicates that the probability is highly con-
centrated around a particular point, whereas a flatter distribu-
tion indicates a higher uncertainty. Given some subjective opinion
ωx = (bx ,dx ,ux ,ax ) (whereW = 2 by default): α = bx ∗Wux +ax ∗W ,
and β = dx ∗Wux + (1 − ax ) ∗W .
Subjective opinions can be combined (or separated) with various
operators [21]. In this work we will use “belief fusion" operators.
Their purpose is to ‘fuse’ evidence from different sources about a
particular phenomenon, in order to “produce an opinion that better
reflects the collection of different opinions, or that is closer to the
ground truth than each opinion in isolation” [21]. For a group of
subjective opinions, there are many different ways in which they
could be combined, and choosing the wrong operator can yield
counter-intuitive results (this was the basis for Zadeh’s criticism of
Dempster Shafer theory [38] which, at the time, had only a single
Belief Fusion operator).
In this work we will be fusing opinions that represent multiple
experimental results. To accommodate this we apply a Weighted
Belief Fusion operator, originally proposed by Jøsang [21]. This
operator produces a fused opinion that attributes weight to its
constituent opinions based on their confidence; opinions with less
uncertainty are given more weight. The version we use here is a
binomial version of the multi-source (i.e., associative) adaptation
of Jøsang’s original binary operator by van der Heijden et al. [35],
which allows us to accommodate more than two opinions.
Definition 3.5. The Weighted Belief Fusion for multiple sources:
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4 ANALYSING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
WITH SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
Let us recall our running example from Section 2.2. For every site
of the multi-site study, the results (Table 1) indicate some positive
effect of TDD versus ITL. However, each result is subject to various
sources of uncertainty - wide confidence intervals, low power, and
other moderating factors such as the experience of the candidates.
It is important that any communication of these results and con-
clusions captures this associated uncertainty. The challenge we
address in this paper is to develop a process by which to express
the magnitude and extent of this uncertainty in a precise manner.
2For space reasons we restrict ourselves to the situation where (∀A ∈ A : uAX ,
0) ∧ (∃A ∈ A : uAX , 1) - the other cases are also defined by van der Heijden et al.
[35].
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We believe that Subjective Logic presents a helpful framework
within which to capture and reason about this uncertainty. In-
stead of interpreting data-points and their associated statistics at
face-value, casting them as Subjective Opinions enables us to as-
sociate them with a degree of uncertainty. The Subjective Logic
then enables us to aggregate and compare results in such a way
that uncertainty becomes a primary factor. This section presents
an approach to derive subjective opinions from an experiment.
In order to reason about experimental data in terms of Subjective
Logic it is necessary to (1) decide which experimental outcomes to
represent as subjective-opinions, and (2) to populate these opinions
with appropriate belief, disbelief and uncertainty values. Given the
diverse range of empirical settings and analyses, we endeavour to
present an approach that is flexible and non-prescriptive. To offer a
more concrete impression of how this might be applied in practice,
we illustrate our approach with reference to TDD versus ITL study
from Section 2.2.
4.1 Decomposing Experiments into Subjective
Opinions
Every subjective opinion represents a belief in some proposition,
with an associated measure of uncertainty. There are two types of
subjective opinion; those that are computed as the result of some
operation (e.g., belief-fusion), and those that are obtained directly
from data (or human input). In order to apply Subjective Logic in an
experimental setting, we start by identifying a subjective opinion
for each research question.
It is important to highlight that this application of Subjective
Logic is currently restricted to research questions that can be
phrased or interpreted as ‘yes or no’ questions. The subjective
opinions we refer to in this paper are binomial3. The point is that,
in an empirical context, the answer to such questions is often un-
certain, and subject to doubt (which is what motivates our use of
Subjective Logic).
Each high level subjective opinion (corresponding to a research
question) is obtained by combining (‘fusing’) several low-level sub-
jective opinions, which represent the “information sources” from
which the answer is to be derived. The granularity of these low-
level subjective opinions is flexible. The experimenter might wish
to wrap several data-analyses into a single subjective opinion, or
might wish to create a more granular set of opinions where each
represents a separate information source. This flexibility means that
the approach is straightforward to extend to the scenario discussed
in Section 4.2.1, where we are seeking to aggregate the results from
multiple experiments. For such cases (as we shall demonstrate) the
subjective opinions that are computed for each individual exper-
iment can themselves be fused together to provide an aggregate
subjective opinion.
4.2 Forming Subjective Opinions from
Experimental Data
For each low-level source of information that feeds into an answer
to a research question (e.g., the outcome of a statistical analysis),
3Subjective Logic does offer other types of opinions - Multinomial and Hyper opinions
[21], which could in principle offer the basis for capturing results for more complex
research questions, and this is an avenue we intend to explore in future work.
it is necessary to formulate a subjective opinion. In our setting,
the meaning of an individual subjective opinion is illustrated in
Figure 2(b): A high belief value should support a positive answer to
the high-level research question. A high disbelief should support
a negative answer. A high degree of uncertainty should reduce
the extent to which the answer to the overall research question is
supported in either direction.
The question of how to define the values of belief, disbelief, and
uncertainty is highly dependent on the nature of the sources of
information. They may be possible to derive entirely from statistical
data; effect-sizes can modulate belief and disbelief, and measures
such as Confidence Intervals or statistical power can modulate the
uncertainty. However in some settings, for example for qualitative
studies or for situations where the analyst is aware of threats to the
validity of the data that do not manifest themselves in the statistics,
it will be necessary to provide the subjective-opinion values by
hand, ideally by consensus with other researchers.
Regardless of whether the opinion values are derived automati-
cally or by hand, there is a specific two-phase process that can be
adopted. For some source of information x we start by deriving a
measure of uncertainty ux about that source (between 0 and 1). For
example, if the source of information is a statistic, we could map the
confidence interval to a value between 0 (there is no interval at all)
and 1 (the confidence interval is too large for the statistic to convey
any useful information). The overriding constraint for subjective
opinions is that the bx +dx +ux = 1. Knowing ux provides us with
a fixed probability (or belief) mass (1−ux ) that can be split between
bx and dx .
For this split, we start with some value e that represents the
source of information in question (as an example, let it be some
effect size statistic). A high value of e should correspond to a high
belief and a low disbelief, and a low value should correspond to a
low belief and a high disbelief. To map this to bx and dx we first
scale e such that 0 ≤ e ≤ 1. From this, bx can be calculated as
bx = e ∗ (1 − u), and dx can be calculated as dx = (1 − e) ∗ (1 − u).
In other words, if e = 1, bx is at its highest possible value and dx at
its lowest, and vice versa if e = 0.
4.2.1 Illustration of Running Example. We illustrate the approach
by applying it to the running example for the TDD study. For
this the top-level subjective opinion represents our belief in the
hypothesis that TDD outperforms ITL. We wish to aggregate the
results for all of the experiments, so we capture the outcomes for
each experiment as a single subjective opinion.
We start by, for each low-level subjective opinion, computing an
uncertainty value. There are several possible approaches by which
to derive an uncertainty value. One could provide a value based on
intuition, e.g., by scaling a Likert-scale assessment to the interval
between 0 and 1. Alternatively, one could use the statistical data
in a more direct manner. For this example we have used a simple
formula, provided in Appendix A. For the F-Secure H example, this
gives us a value of 0.43 (leaving us with a remaining belief mass of
0.57 to divide between belief and disbelief.
To determine how this belief mass is divided up, we produce
our value e from the confidence interval around the effect size,
by computing its extent as a proportion of the maximum extent:
e = 1 − cimax−cimin
(2.7−−2.7) . A positive effect (which we limit at 2.7 [11])
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Table 2: Subjective opinions for all experiments in running
example
Experiment Belief Disbelief Uncertainty
F-Secure H 0.31 0.26 0.43
F-Secure K 0.32 0.24 0.45
F-Secure O 0.24 0.05 0.71
UPV 0.20 0.07 0.71
Figure 3: Fusion of (subjective opinions of) results from four
experiments into a single fused subjective opinion.
indicates a strong affirmative answer to the research question. A
negative effect size (which we limit at -2.7) indicates a negative
answer. Given these limits, we calculate e = effect−(−2.7)
(2.7−−2.7) . For our
F-Secure H study, the effect size is 0.25, which gives us an e value
of 0.55.
Having computed e , we obtain b and d :
• b = (0.55) ∗ (1 − 0.43) = 0.31
• d = (1 − 0.55) ∗ (1 − 0.43) = 0.26
This results in a subjective opinion of (b = 0.34,d = 0.28,u =
0.38). The full set of subjective opinions for all of the experiments
are shown in Table 2. The visualisations of the barycentric triangles
and the corresponding beta distributions are shown in the bottom
box (labelled ‘All’) in Figure 3. NB the beta distribution [0,1] is
rescaled to [-2.7, 2.7] since this is our range of admissible effect
sizes. These show a clear difference between the F-Secure H and K
experiments, which have a moderate effect size but less uncertainty,
and the F-Secure O and UPV experiments, which have a higher
effect size but also more uncertainty. The higher uncertainty is
reflected in the spread the distributions; higher certainty leads to a
more discernible peak.
4.3 Fusing Experimental Results
When there are multiple results, either within a single experimental
setting or from multiple replications of the same experiment, it is
often helpful to be able to aggregate them [32]. For this we use the
Weighted Belief Fusion operator [35] (see Definition 3.5), which
attributes a greater weighting to opinions with less uncertainty:
for a set of experiments E on some phenomenon X , where each
experiment E ∈ E produces a subjective opinion ωEX , we compute
the fusion ω ⋄̂EX .
Although we choose this operator here, there are numerous al-
ternative operators that could be considered, depending on the an-
alyst’s goals when it comes to combining or aggregating evidence.
For example, the Averaging Fusion operator combines opinions
without weighting them, or the Cumulative Fusion operator com-
bines opinions in such a way that every additional piece of evidence
will only ever increase the fused belief level [3, 21].
4.3.1 Illustration on Running Example. To illustrate the fusion, we
combine the subjective opinions for all four experiments shown in
Table 2. Here, the set of experimentsE = {ωf sH ,ωf sK ,ωf sO ,UPV },
andX represents the belief that TDDoutperforms ITL. TheWeighted





0.20,u ⋄̂EX = 0.51.
This fused opinion and the corresponding beta distribution are
shown in the top of Figure 3. The projected probability (Definition
3.3) for the fused opinion is 0.55, albeit with high level of uncertainty,
which leads to the broad arc of the beta distribution, without a
distinctive peak. It is worth highlighting that this subjective opinion
(and corresponding beta distribution) are all we need to interpret
the results. All of the data-points that convey information about the
various sources of uncertainty - moderators, confidence intervals,
etc., are incorporated into the uncertainty value.




For our case-study we re-examine data from two studies on the
defect-proneness of different programming languages. We use data
from a study by Nanz and Furia, using the Rosetta Code archive
to compare failure rates (and other characteristics) of different
program languages [26]. We supplement this with the results of
a different study on programming language defects by Ray et al.
[29] that was referred to by Nanz and Furia. The study by Ray et al.
does not record execution failures, but instead records defects as
bug-fixes mined from GitHub repositories.
This presents an interesting aggregation challenge. The studies
use differing methodologies and collect different types of data from
different sources. Whereas we access the raw data in the Nanz and
Furia study, we only access the summary data in the Ray study. Both
sources of data are subject to very different types of uncertainty.
For our analysis, we have made the full code and dataset avail-
able4. This not only contains the code used to implement the fusion
operator and to visualise the results, but also provides a record of
the procedures used to extract the belief, disbelief, and uncertainty
values from the data.
4https://figshare.com/s/5b26abc456f34664f415
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5.1 Subjective Logic Analysis
For our analysis we start with the Nanz and Furia study, and create
a subjective opinion for failure-proneness for each language. For
this we use the size of the confidence intervals, the numbers of
missing implementations (missing implementations correspond to
an absence of data), and the number of timeouts (a timeout may
not necessarily amount to a failure) to form an uncertainty score.
The function that computes this from the data is in the data and
code-pack for this paper. The results are shown in Table 3, and
the corresponding barycentric triangles and Beta distributions are
visualised in the bottom half of Figure 4. From this we note that, for
all of the weakly-typed languages, the uncertainty scores are quite
low, whereas for all of the strongly-typed languages apart from
Go, there is a much higher degree of uncertainty (mainly because
of lower availability of implementations and a higher number of
time-outs).
We now repeat this process for an earlier study by Ray et al.
[29]. This analysis spanned a selection of 728 GitHub projects,
used commit messages to identify bug-fixes, and used these to
derive statistics about the prevalence of defects, differentiated by
the language in which they were written. For this analysis, the
authors fitted a Negative Binomial Regression (NBR) model [16] to
the data, such that each language was associated with a coefficient
(in the range [-1,1]) and a p-value. Since the original study was
carried out, Ray et al. followed-it up with a re-analysis of the data
[30]. The study has since also been replicated in a more in-depth
manner by Berger et al. [1].
Clearly there are fundamental differences between Nanz and
Furia’s, and the study by Ray et al.. The former counts defects in
terms of observed execution failures, whereas the latter counts
defects in terms of recorded source-code fixes. The former concen-
trated on reasonably small, atomic programming tasks, whereas
the latter concentrated on a wide range of systems of varying sizes.
Nevertheless, their aims are broadly the same; to determine the
“defect-proneness” of projects, and to differentiate between these in
terms of the choice (or type) of language.
For the study by Ray et al. we only access their published statis-
tics, not the raw data. This includes, for each language, a coefficient
from the regression model indicating the relative prevalence of
defects, a standard error, a statistical significance5, and the number
of projects examined for each language. The results are shown in
Table 46.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the resulting opinions, fused in
to strongly / weakly typed groups. One thing to note is that, since
we only have access to summary statistics, the uncertainty is higher
than for the Nanz and Furia study. The fused opinions at the top do
however agree with Nanz and Furia (the projected probability for
the fused strongly-typed opinions is 0.51 whereas the probability
for weakly-typed opinions is 0.45). The difference is however even
more marginal than with Nanz and Furia (0.06).
5Note that Subjective Logic is agnostic about the value and problems associated with
null hypothesis significance testing [5]. In this example we simply reason that a
‘significant’ p value has some evidential value against the null hypothesis.
6In their replication, Berger et al. [1] produced results that differed, in many cases
lowering the effect and significance of the findings. We include the original results
here because Berger’s results have not yet (to our knowledge) been peer-reviewed,
and Ray’s results were what Nanz et al. were referring to. Of course, Berger’s newer
results could be incorporated in a similar fashion.
In both studies defects are represented differently (execution
failures in Nanz and Furia’s study versus code repairs in Ray et
al.’s). In one we derive our values from raw data (proportions of
executions that fail for each language) and in the other we obtain
our effect sizes from the published summary statistic. Both studies
are subject to different sources of uncertainty. By encoding both
sets of results as subjective opinions, it becomes possible to analyse
them alongside each other (accepting that the different effect-size
scales are mapped to a single generic ‘probability scale’ [0, 1].
There two apparent options for fusing the results: (1) To fuse the
individual subjective opinions from both experiments into fused
opinions for strong and weak languages respectively, or (2) to fuse
the fused opinions for strong languages from both experiments with
each other, and to do the same for weak languages. We choose the
latter because it enforces an equal weighting for each experiment
(but different settings might suit alternative fusion arrangements).
The results of the fusion are shown in Figure 6.
As would be expected, the fused opinions corroborate the find-
ings from both studies that strongly typed languages tend to lead
to fewer defects (i.e., execution failures or code fixes) than weakly-
typed languages. However, the fused results also indicate that there
is a slightly higher degree of uncertainty surrounding the results
for strongly typed languages.
5.2 Discussion
The main strength of Subjective Logic is the flexibility offered by
the use of subjective opinions. Once encoded as subjective opinions,
the origin or type of the underlying data no longer matters, and
they can be fused or compared against each other as required,
whilst explicitly factoring in the associated (un-)certainties. In our
analysis of the two fault studies, for example, we base our findings
on completely different sources of information, subject to very
different sources of uncertainty, yet still the results are summarised
in a manner that makes them easy to interpret and compare.
A caveat is that the process of defining the uncertainty, belief,
and disbelief values is inherently subjective. Different analysts
might identify different sources of uncertainty, or interpret the
underlying statistical analyses differently. As a consequence, it
is important that the use of subjective logic to analyse empirical
results is accompanied by a transparent description (or even source
code) that is used to encode the subjective beliefs. For our case study,
the results from both experiments were encoded into subjective
opinions using fixed formulae (written in R), which are available as
part of the data and source code accompanying the paper.
Throughout this paper, we have only used van der Heijden’s
Weighted Belief Fusion operator [35] (Definition 3.5). This is in-
tended for situations where we wish to ‘average’ the underlying
beliefs (whilst weighting them in terms of their confidence so
that opinions with lower uncertainty are given more weight). This
makes sense for our case study. From Figure 6, it is clear that the
Nanz results offer (according to our interpretation) greater certainty
than the Ray results, and should therefore be weighted accordingly
during fusion.
It is important to emphasise that we are not restricted to this
form of fusion in Subjective Logic. There are many alternative
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Table 3: Table with summary data and computed subjective opinions for each language
Language Failures Executions Timeouts Implemented Effect CI lower CI upper Belief Disbelief Uncertainty
C 51 442 0.11 0.81 0.35 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.56 0.13
Python 215 751 0.10 0.92 0.56 0.53 0.60 0.52 0.40 0.08
Ruby 71 563 0.08 0.87 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.33 0.57 0.10
Fused weak 0.39 0.5 0.1
C sharp 18 307 0.20 0.58 0.25 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.57 0.24
F Sharp 24 236 0.09 0.46 0.33 0.26 0.39 0.24 0.50 0.25
Go 8 427 0.09 0.80 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.75 0.13
Haskell 25 426 0.12 0.68 0.25 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.62 0.18
Java 80 339 0.11 0.63 0.51 0.45 0.56 0.41 0.40 0.19
Fused strong 0.22 0.59 0.18
Figure 4: Visualisation of subjective opinions for failure data from study by Nanz and Furia, with fusion into strongly and
weakly-typed languages.
fusion operators [3, 21], which are better suited to different sce-
narios. It is also possible to use Addition or Subtraction operators
[21] if a particular information source can only have a positive or
respectively negative effect on the overall assessment.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
As is the case with most disciplines, the task of deriving valid in-
sights and inferences from empirical data (or groups of studies)
can be challenging. Conclusions are invariably subject to caveats
and threats to validity. Data can be missing, noisy, or misleading.
Ultimately, any results from an empirical study are inherently un-
certain, and any conclusions to be drawn from these results need
to explicitly take this uncertainty into account.
We have shown how Subjective Logic can be used to explicitly
incorporate this uncertainty into the process of reasoning about
empirical data. This has been demonstrated with respect to a small
running-example and a larger study of the relationship between
programming languages and run-time failures. We believe this
transparency in reasoning contributes to research progress. Addi-
tionally, we have shown how Subjective Logic can also be used at a
Meta-analysis level to fuse together different results from multiple
studies and multiple types of study.
Of course Subjective Logic is not a panacea to all research ills.
Skill, judgement and insight are required. Researcher bias could
creep in. However, these problems can be mitigated by the explicit
nature of the reasoning. Other researchers are free to adopt different
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Figure 5: Visualisation of subjective opinions for study by Ray et al.
Table 4: Summary results from NBR produced by Rayet al.
Label Coeff. Std.err. Proj. Bel. Dis. Unc.
C 0.11 0.04 220 0.36 0.23 0.40
C++ 0.18 0.04 149 0.45 0.21 0.34
Clojure -0.30 0.05 60 0.14 0.54 0.32
CoffeeScript 0.06 0.05 92 0.29 0.23 0.48
Erlang -0.03 0.05 51 0.24 0.27 0.49
JavaScript 0.03 0.03 432 0.28 0.25 0.47
Objective-C 0.15 0.05 93 0.37 0.20 0.42
Perl -0.12 0.08 106 0.21 0.34 0.45
PHP 0.10 0.05 109 0.33 0.22 0.46
Python 0.08 0.04 286 0.33 0.24 0.43
Ruby -0.13 0.05 188 0.23 0.38 0.39
TypeScript 0.15 0.10 14 0.33 0.18 0.49
Fused weak 0.30 0.27 0.42
C sharp -0.02 0.05 77 0.25 0.27 0.49
Go -0.11 0.06 54 0.21 0.32 0.47
Haskell -0.26 0.06 55 0.15 0.47 0.38
Java -0.06 0.04 141 0.23 0.30 0.47
Scala -0.24 0.05 55 0.16 0.45 0.39
Fused strong 0.25 0.35 0.40
stances and reach different conclusions. We make progress through
meaningful dialogue.
So far, our use of Subjective Logic has focused on the expression
of results as subjective opinions and the use of fusion operators to
combine empirical results. However, the extension of approaches
such as Bayesian Networks to incorporate subjective opinions [21]
Figure 6: Fusion of all results from defect studies by Nanz
and Furia and Ray et al.
makes it possible to apply other forms of reasoning – for example,
working backwards from “aggregate” probabilities to identify the
individual roles of different potential causes. Our future work will
investigate how these more advanced Subjective Logic techniques
can be used to reason about the various uncertainties that arise
within Software Engineering empirical studies.
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A UNCERTAINTY FORMULA FOR THE
RUNNING EXAMPLE
For this the summary data from the experiments (Table 1) provides
us with the following factors:
• A set of expertise-ratings where each value is in the range
[0, 4] and is the average ordinal score submitted by partici-
pants to rate their ability to program, their experience with
Java, their experience with unit testing, and their experience
with JUnit.
• A confidence interval for the effect-size.
• The statistical power of the result [4].
We would consider the results to be at its maximum if the pro-
grammer’s expertise is uniformly high (4), the CI is zero, and there
is a statistical power of 1. To compute the uncertainty we first map
each of these measures to a score between 0 and 1. expertise =
prog+java+unit+junit
(4+4+4+4) is calculated as the sum of actual expertise
scores divided by themaximumpossible scores. ci = 1− ciupper−cilower5.4
measures the CI as a proportion of 5.4 - this limit is based on Fer-
guson’s heuristic [11] that a Hedges’ g (which the CI is pertaining
to) of 2.7 amounts to a “strong effect”, so a confidence interval that
spans this in both directions (+2.7 and -2.7) would amount to 5.4.
We take pow to just be the unadulterated power value. If we apply
this to the first experiment (F-Secure H) in Table 1, the result would
be computed as follows:
• expertise = 3.67+2.33+2.17+2.174+4+4+4 =
10.34
16 = 0.646
• ci = 1.39−(−0.89)2.7−(−2.7) = 0.42
• pow = 0.071
Averaging these results in an uncertainty value of 0.38.
